Strategic Interaction in Political Competition: Evidence from Spatial Effects across Chinese Cities个人简介

被阅览数:次  发布时间:2014/04/23 16:21:26

主讲人: 虞吉海 教授
主讲人简介:  (北京大学光华管理学院)
简介:
  Promotion of local officials in China is decided by their upper-level governments which evaluate their performance largely based on local economic growth. Such a promotion scheme leads to tournament competition among local government leaders at the same level. We test the hypothesis of tournament competition by studying the spatial effects across Chinese prefectural-level cities. Employing recently developed tools in spatial econometrics, we document a strong spatial effect for city-level total investment which fuels short-run economic growth. This spatial effect is shown to occur only for cities within the same province, but not for neighboring cities located in different provinces. We also find that within the same province, the spatial effect mainly exists for cities with similar economic ranking but not for cities that are geographically proximate. The spatial effect tends to diminish for city leaders who are close to the end of their political careers. These findings suggest that the spatial effect in investment is driven by strategic interactions among political rivals in tournament competition. We rule out alternative factors such as economic spillovers and tax competition as the key drivers of the spatial effect.
时间: 2014年4月3日(周四)下午16:30-17:30
地点: 经济楼N座302室
期数: 厦门大学统计学高级系列讲座
主办单位: 经济学院、王亚南经济研究院
类型: 系列讲座

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